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ABSTRACT. Technocratic attitudes suggest that decisions about environmental 
policy should be led by scientific experts. Such decisions, it is expected, will be 
more rational than any arrived at by a democratic mediation between the narrow, 
short-term interests and uninformed preferences of the general public. Within 
green political theory, deliberative democracy has emerged as the dominant 
repost to technocracy, offering an account of how democratic polities can deal 
with complex scientific and technological decisions through the emergence of 
communicative rationality. This article argues that neither appeals to expert 
knowledge, nor communicative rationality, are likely to deliver the optimal green 
outcomes that proponents suggest, but rather will cover up the inevitable dis-
agreements over environmental policy making. Instead the article suggests that 
more ecologically-sensitive and democratic decision making about complex 
 scientific and technological issues can emerge if we acknowledge the differently 
embodied perspectives of decision-makers – from scientists to citizens. This 
prioritises democratic means over green ends, yet incorporates the environment 
at the beginning of the decision-making process. The article aims to sketch out the 
theoretical and practical implications of such an embodied turn for responding 
to the anti-democratic tendencies of environmental technocracy.
KEYWORDS. Environment, democracy, political agonism, embodiment, Tully, 
deliberation, technocracy
I. INTRODUCTION
Should decisions about environmental issues be entrusted to demo-cratic politics? Many are weary of the facile squabbling between self-
interested sectional interests and power hungry politicians, who appear 
unable to prioritise the decisive action needed to ensure long-term sus-
tainability. While despair at the slow and tortuous process of democratic 
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decision-making is common, for some the failure to act decisively has led 
to a denouncement of democracy itself.
This latter response precipitated the emergence of ‘eco-authoritarian-
ism’, which reared its head in the 1970s in response to concerns about 
the exponential growth of the human population (Hardin 1972; Ophuls 
1977). Receding from prominence for a few decades, the eco-authoritarian 
argument has recently revived, albeit in response to different concerns 
(Dobson 2010). The scientist James Lovelock, for example, claims that 
democracies impede the urgent action needed to tackle climate change: 
“We need a more authoritarian world. We’ve become a sort of cheeky, 
egalitarian world where everyone can have their say […] it may be neces-
sary to put democracy on hold for a while” (Lovelock 2010).
This threat of eco-authoritarianism is often linked to a rising ten-
dency towards technocracy, which suggests that decisions should be left 
to those with relevant scientific and technical expertise: this, it is implied, 
will speed up decision making and generate more effective green out-
comes. Yet many of these experts themselves strongly reject the notion that 
they can agree upon the ‘right’ decision. What is required is that environ-
mental policy-making is sensitive to the insights of experts while these 
insights are also open to challenge. On what basis might it be argued that 
a democratic system, which recognises the legitimacy and standing of inputs 
from experts and non-experts alike, can produce ecologically-orientated 
decisions? How, in other words, might democracy be made ‘greener’?
The loudest defence of democracy within green political thought has 
come from proponents of deliberative democracy who attempt to show 
that democratic means do not necessarily preclude decisive and rational 
green ends. By drawing experts and non-experts, including those who 
have traditionally been excluded from politics, into fair and equal forms 
of communication the expectation is that decisions will be more environ-
mentally sensitive. 
In the present contribution, we will examine the claims made by both 
technocrats and deliberative democrats. We find both are inadequate, 
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since both fail to adequately acknowledge the implications of two inter-
related features of political decision making: first, the embodiedness of 
all political perspectives; second, the inevitability of disagreement in the 
democratic process.
Following the insights of ecological, phenomenological and feminist 
thinking, we stress the importance of recognising that human perspectives 
are always embodied. While a focus upon material and ecological situated-
ness opens new ways of fostering mutual understanding and coalition-
building, it simultaneously reveals the irreducibility of political difference. 
Recognition of the interrelationship between corporeal existence and 
political perspective challenges the suggestion that it is possible to reach 
rational agreement between experts (technocracy) or in a more inclusive 
discussion (deliberative democracy). Foregrounding the body and its 
 environment appends a question mark to the possibility of suppressing 
or transcending disagreement. While technocrats attempt to rid politics 
of the inevitable disagreement arising in a democracy by explicitly shut-
ting it out, deliberative democrats often aim to manoeuvre past such 
dissent. We propose an entirely different orientation towards disagree-
ment, an agonistic one that recognises its inexorableness and accepts that 
any agreement is only partial and temporary. 
Though embodiment draws attention to disagreement, it nevertheless 
helps us to acknowledge the significance of the environment for any 
political project and collective from the outset. It is entirely possible, 
therefore, that more ecologically-sensitive decision making occurs when 
inevitable disagreement between differently embodied political identifica-
tions is acknowledged. Instead of a focus on green ends or on democratic 
means, we assert the importance of attentiveness to differentially embod-
ied beginnings. 
The article divides into three sections. First, we offer a critique of 
technocracy and the problematic expectations it has regarding expert 
knowledge and green ends. Second, we consider deliberative democracy 
and its attempt to remove disagreement through democratic means. 
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Finally, we tentatively offer a vision of green democracy in which we 
acknowledge the inevitability of disagreement between differently embod-
ied perspectives. We conclude by suggesting that technological expertise 
should not dominate decision making, but ought rather to be recognised 
as a respected part of democratic interaction that is sensitised, politicised 
and ‘greened’ through an emphasis on embodied disagreement. 
II. TECHNOCRATIC TENDENCIES AND RATIONAL GREEN ENDS
The belief that technological experts should be given a privileged position 
in the political process to define policy is often a reaction to the perceived 
failure of our democratic institutions to act decisively in the face of envi-
ronmental threats such as climate change. Technocracy can be understood 
in at least two senses. First, a tendency within democratic governance 
to give ever more influence in political decision-making to those with 
particular forms of scientific and/or technological expertise. A second 
understanding is technocracy as a form of political organization: the nor-
mative position that it is such experts themselves who should be making 
relevant political decisions. Technocracy as a form of political organiza-
tion is by its nature a form of authoritarianism: the democratic process is 
surrendered to those with particular forms of scientific and technical 
knowledge.
Arguably the most prominent anti-democratic voice in environmen-
talism is that of James Lovelock, who believes it is too late to try to miti-
gate climate change. For him, adaptation is urgently needed, but democratic 
politics is simply taking too long: “[…] the only clear conclusion we can 
draw from the changing climate and people’s response to it is that there 
is little time left to act […]. In theory we could eat less and save energy 
but in practice we never will, unless made to do so” (2009, 934). He warns 
that democratic government may need to be replaced by an eco-authori-
tarianism in which the necessary measures are forced upon populations: 
“[…] orderly survival requires an unusual degree of human understanding 
97154.indb   50 27/03/14   09:16
— 51 —
Ethical Perspectives 21 (2014) 1
AMANDA MACHIN AND GRAHAM SMITH – ENDS, MEANS, BEGINNINGS
and leadership and may require, as in war, the suspension of democratic 
government” (2009, 1154). For Lovelock, climate change is a war situa-
tion, and scientists should be conscripted to serve their governments. 
He echoes the words William Ophuls spoke 40 years ago in response to 
the concern about the pressures put on natural resources by a growing 
population: “The kind of democracy that we have – laissez-faire, mass 
democracy characterized by muddling through – is out. It is not going to 
work […]. Because you simply cannot have the man on the street making 
decisions about nuclear technology” (Ophuls 1974).
David Shearman and Joseph Wayne Smith explicitly advocate the 
introduction of “[…] a platonic form of authoritarianism based on the 
rule of experts” (2007, 2). They point out that individuals are never going 
to vote for a reduced standard of living, leading them to the conclusion 
that “[…] democracy itself is a big problem” (2007, xv). They reject all 
forms of democracy: “[…] democratic institutions are not suited to deal 
with crisis case situations” (2007, 15). Environmental authoritarianism is 
understood here to be necessary for the survival of humanity and is a 
discourse that has always haunted green political theory (Beeson 2010; 
Dryzek 2012).
Explicit support for technocratic authoritarian rule remains rare. 
What is more common is support for privileging the voice of techno-
logical experts in political decision-making. While our attention tends 
to focus on natural scientists and engineers, the increasing influence of 
(neo-classical) economists also falls into this category of technocracy. We 
only need to reflect on the number of economists within government 
departments compared with other forms of social researchers to realise 
the influence this form of expertise has on the democratic process (note 
also that relevant departments tend to distinguish between economics 
and social research committees, with the former more extensively staffed 
and hence influential). The publication of Blueprint for a Green Economy 
and similar texts in the late 1980s marked the beginning of an influential 
movement to systematically extend the toolkit of economists into the 
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world of environmental valuation and political decision-making (Pearce 
et al. 1989); the privileged role of economists in the assessment of eco-
system services being just the latest example.1 The existence of economic 
advisors in itself is not necessarily anti-democratic, however the elevation 
of their advice above other forms of knowledge and, too often, above 
political contestation surely is.
There are a number of reasons to be concerned about technocracy 
both as a form of political organisation and as a tendency within contem-
porary governance. A standard response to any conception of enlightened 
authoritarian rule is why proponents believe that this particular set of 
rulers will remain enlightened: in this case ecologically enlightened. The 
history of authoritarianism is one of corruption of power and scientific 
experts are no less immune to corruptive tendencies than any other citi-
zens. Similarly, Bob Taylor argues: “If policy is defined and controlled 
solely by experts, elites, ideological minorities or philosopher kings, 
it necessarily represents the interests, concerns and values of only a frac-
tion of the community” (1996, 101). Revoking democratic processes 
removes the very mechanisms through which the corruption of political 
power can be checked.
The more environmental decisions are placed in the hands of experts, 
whether entirely or partially, explicitly or covertly, the less opening there 
is for important warnings to be heard and valid alternatives to be seen. 
The obvious safeguards provided by democracy mean that there are few 
advocates of technocracy as a form of political organisation. The tendency 
to funnel decision making towards experts is more discernible, our earlier 
discussion of the role of economists being one prominent example. Here, 
democracy is still ostensibly supported while slowly and steadily it is being 
hollowed out of political contestation and filled in by claims of certainty 
and knowledge. Expertise is expected to provide solutions to environ-
mental problems and to reveal the ‘facts’ regarding an environmental issue. 
This depoliticises the issue while it is at the same time a deeply political 
move. Technocracy elides technological knowledge with political and 
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ethical judgement, obfuscating the incommensurability between scientific 
knowledge, economic valuation, and political decision (Pielke 2004).
As Shelia Jasanoff points out, science only gives us part of the picture 
when it comes to collective decision making: “[…] science cannot tell us 
where and when disaster will strike, how to allocate resources between 
prevention and mitigation, which activities to target first in reducing green-
house gases or whom to hold responsible for protecting the poor” (2007). 
Unease is therefore generated by the ‘politicisation of science’ by both 
politicians and scientists. Politicians have been accused of misappropriat-
ing scientific evidence to either obfuscate or close down policy options 
(Demeritt 2001; Hillerbrand and Ghil 2008). But challenges have been 
directed towards scientists too for arguing that their results compel par-
ticular policies (Pielke 2004). In both cases science “[…] becomes a con-
venient and necessary means to removing certain options from a debate 
without explicitly dealing with disputes over values” (Pielke 2004, 409). 
A parallel elision is discernible in much environmental economics: 
to try to equate non-market and market values is a ‘category mistake’. 
This is obvious in the increased use of economic valuation techniques 
within government decision-making processes that assumes the full cap-
ture of relevant environmental values (Keat 1997; O’Neill 1993; Smith 
2003, 29-51). Not only is there concern that utilitarian valuation tech-
niques misrepresent the plural and often incommensurable values we 
associate with the environment, but that economists’ technical expertise 
shrouds what are often political judgements from public scrutiny. Smith 
highlights how public inquiries in the UK have dismissed challenges to 
politically dubious judgements about the value of life and time savings 
within the Department of Transport’s cost-benefit analysis; judgements 
that provided the rationale for major environmentally destructive road 
construction programmes (see Smith 2003, 45-48). As Michael Sandel 
warns, economists can tell us about some of the implications of political 
decisions, but they cannot tell us what decisions to make or how to make 
them (2009).
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Scientists have often been quick to point out the limits of their own 
sphere of expertise – a trait that is less obvious amongst economists! 
For example, the climate scientist James S. Risbey argues that scientists 
cannot simply state at what levels greenhouse gases are ‘safe’ or ‘danger-
ous’. He urges us to: “[…] acknowledge at the outset the arbitrary and 
conditional nature of any specific choice or definition of what is danger-
ous and what is not” (2006, 527). Similarly, a report by the august Royal 
Society notes: “[…] policy choices about climate change have to be made 
in the absence of perfect knowledge. Even if the remaining uncertainties 
were substantially resolved, the wide variety of interests, cultures and 
beliefs in society would make consensus about such choices difficult to 
achieve” (2010, 13).
Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz have responded to the rise of 
urgent issues for which both facts and values are disputed by promoting 
a different way of practising science. Their ‘post-normal science’ does 
not attempt to banish uncertainly, but rather to manage it. Turning eco-
authoritarian arguments on their head, Funtowicz and Ravetz suggest that 
decisions should be more rather than less inclusive. Rather than limiting 
participation to scientific elites as a way of ensuring better decision mak-
ing, the response to issues such as climate change they suggest requires 
an extension of the decision-making community to new participants. 
In particular ‘post-normal science’ requires the integration of local knowl-
edge into scientific investigation in order to enrich scientific expertise: 
“Knowledge of local conditions may determine which data are strong and 
relevant, and can also help to define the policy problems” (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz 1993, 753).
The more conservative Royal Society comes to similar conclusions 
in discussing adaptation to climate change: “Countries must be prepared 
to adapt to climate change by using scientific and technological exper-
tise allied to local knowledge” (2009). The Brundtland Report offers a 
comparable analysis: “The law alone cannot enforce the common interest. 
It principally needs community knowledge and support, which entails 
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greater public participation in the decisions that affect the environment” 
(WCED 1987, 63). Again, other international documents, such as the 
Aarhus Convention, offer similar support for increased participation. 
III. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC MEANS
While recognising the deficiencies of actually-existing democratic gover-
nance, many greens have turned to deliberative democracy rather than 
technocracy as the most suitable form of political organisation for dealing 
with complex scientific and technological issues. Deliberative democracy 
has established itself as a new-orthodoxy within democratic theory and 
has found a high degree of support among green political theorists (Barry 
1999; Dryzek 2000; Smith 2003).
James Bohman provides us with a widely accepted definition of 
deliberative democracy: “Deliberative democracy, broadly defined, is 
[…] any one of a family of views according to which the public delib-
eration of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political deci-
sion making and self-government’ (1998, 401). Deliberative democracy 
is typically contrasted with aggregative forms of democracy in which 
collective decision making progresses through the aggregation of prefer-
ences. For deliberative democrats there has been a failure within demo-
cratic theory to consider how preferences have been formed; and how 
they might legitimately be transformed. As Seyla Benhabib argues:
“[…] the formation of coherent preferences cannot precede deliberation; 
it can only succeed it. Very often individuals’ wishes as well as views and 
opinions conflict with one another. In the course of deliberation and 
the exchange of views with others, individuals become more aware of 
such conflicts and feel compelled to undertake a coherent ordering” 
(1996, 71).
Greens are attracted to deliberative democracy for a number of reasons 
(Smith 2003). Three will suffice here. First, deliberative democracy has 
epistemic value. Deliberation leads to the improved flows of information 
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and social learning that is necessary for dealing with complex environ-
mental problems. Deliberation increases the problem-solving capacity of 
democratic institutions (Dryzek 1987; Barry 1999, 229). Second, it has 
ethical value. David Miller terms this the ‘moralising effect of public dis-
cussion’: narrowly self-regarding preferences that aim to defend environ-
mental despoliation for the gain of sectional interests are difficult to 
advance in the public arena (Miller 1992, 61; Benhabib 1996, 72). Third, 
deliberative democracy is inclusive. The voices of those often excluded 
and marginalised from the democratic process – and with local, direct 
experience and knowledge of their environment – are heard. As Bob 
Pepperman Taylor, argues: “[…] there are good reasons to believe that 
increased democratic opportunities at the most local levels of our societ-
ies will increase demands for environmental protection” (1996, 104). For 
many green political theorists, such characteristics of deliberative democ-
racy mean that expert and lay knowledge and environmental values will 
be articulated and carefully considered in political decision-making. Com-
municative rationality is ‘ecologically-rational’ (Dryzek 1987).
The role of scientific and technological expertise is a subject of much 
consideration with deliberative democracy – theorists are sensitive to the 
potential tension between inclusiveness and claims to expertise. After all, 
citizens typically do not have the time, capacity or inclination to continu-
ally scrutinise scientific developments. Mark Warren has pointed to the 
importance of “a critical and attentive public”, including public pressure 
groups and universities amongst other bodies in debating and challenging 
research agendas and emerging findings (1996, 56); Thomas Christiano 
has explored the way in which a deliberative system can manage the divi-
sion of labour between citizens and their political representatives who 
are responsible for setting social goals and experts who bring their knowl-
edge to bear on the development and implementation of policy options 
(Christiano 2012). As the green political theorist John Barry puts it in 
more colloquial terms, “[…] experts ought to be ‘on tap, not on top’” 
(1999, 200). He goes on to explain: “Whereas techno-optimistic arguments 
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are largely prefaced on the assumption that experts find solutions to eco-
logical problems with little or no input from the non-expert population, 
the incorporation of science within green politics assumes that the appli-
cation of science is within rather than beyond democratic regulation” (1999, 
203; italics original).
A practical insight into the way in which deliberative democrats 
conceive of the role of expertise can be garnered from the institutional 
forms often discussed within this literature. Take, for example, consensus 
conferences originally established in Denmark where a small group of 
(near) randomly selected citizens are brought together over a number of 
days to deliberate on a controversial scientific or technological issue. 
Competing experts are given the opportunity to present to the citizen body 
and are then subject to questions. Once their evidence has been pre-
sented, the citizens deliberate amongst themselves and produce a report. 
In other words, deliberation enabled by expertise with decisions left in the 
hands of citizens (Fischer 2000; Smith 2003). Other mini-public designs 
share a similar division of labour between citizens and experts and are 
often seen as an institutional embodiment of deliberative democracy’s 
approach to expertise (Smith 2009).2
However, while deliberative democrats attempt to include diverse 
voices, criticism has emerged of the role that consensus performs (either 
explicitly or implicitly) within their conceptualisations of democracy 
(Machin 2012). For ideal theorists such as Cohen (1989) and Benhabib 
(1996) the telos of agreement is precisely what makes the democratic dis-
cussion rational and inclusive. In recent developments within deliberative 
democracy, many theorists have accepted that consensus is unlikely to be 
achieved and also extend their conceptions of forms of communication 
beyond a strict interpretation of reason-giving as rational argumentation 
(Smith 2003; Tully 2004; Mansbridge 1999). Yet the degree to which 
accounts of deliberative democracy still view consensus as a regulative 
ideal, and the extent to which this continues to affect consideration of 
democratic arrangements, remains a pertinent question.
97154.indb   57 27/03/14   09:16
— 58 —
 Ethical Perspectives 21 (2014) 1
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – MARCH 2014
Tully is a particularly eloquent critic of deliberative democracy, 
explaining why reasonable agreement cannot be expected on the out-
comes of political discussions. He highlights the impact of such factors 
as asymmetries of power that structure access to decision making; 
 limitations of time; the modification of identities through engagement; 
and the ‘room for manoeuvre’ in interpreting and acting on any agree-
ment (2004, 96). But he goes further than this and points out that 
 disagreement is not limited to outcomes, but also extends to the procedures 
through which democratic decisions are made. In what is a highly sig-
nificant critique, he remarks that while deliberative democrats have gen-
erally recognized that outcomes are subject to dissent, they have tended 
to assume that there could be consensus on democratic procedures 
(2004, 96). Why should reasonable disagreement not also apply to the 
‘procedures of negotiation’ and what is recognised as a ‘reasonable claim’ 
(2004, 97)? In any decision about policy or procedure, disagreement is 
inevitable. 
This then raises a challenge for green politics where, as Barry puts 
it, consensus is often “[…] the preferred, or indeed procedurally required 
result of any decision-making process” (2012, 268). Work within environ-
mental ethics and politics that recognises the plurality of incommen-
surable and incompatible values we associate with the environment chal-
lenges any simple assertion of the possibility of reaching consensus (Smith 
2003, 7-28). As Soper argues, it is necessary to challenge the common 
assumption amongst greens that the plurality of values to which they 
appeal are mutually compatible: “The ecology movement, when viewed 
as a whole, draws its force from a range of arguments whose ethical 
underpinnings are really quite divergent and difficult to reconcile” (1995, 
254). Tully reveals that such dissent is not a matter of the trivial grum-
bling of disgruntled fools, but is entirely reasonable disagreement: “[…] in 
any agreement we reach on procedures, principles, ethics, scientific stud-
ies or policies with respect to the environment […] there will always be 
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an element of reasonable disagreement, and thus the possibility of raising 
a reasonable doubt and dissention” (2001, 162).
Part of Tully’s critique is the question of the extent to which we are 
able to offer rational justification of our perspectives – and to fully com-
prehend the perspectives of others. Such communicative rationality is a 
foundation stone to most accounts of deliberative democracy, and in the 
hands of green deliberative theorists such as Dryzek can be extended into 
the non-human world: “[…] communicative interaction with the natural 
world can and should be an eminently rational affair” (Dryzek 2000, 149). 
Leaving aside the attempt at rendering the communications of nature 
rational, the notion of communicative rationality assumes that we can 
come to understand ourselves, each other and our relation to nature 
through the exchange of reasons (or other forms of communication). 
This appears to imply a degree of individual and collective transparency 
of motivations that is difficult to sustain (Coole 1996).
Tully draws on Wittgenstein to challenge the idea that participants 
in a political discussion are always able to give reasons to justify their 
particular perspectives and positions: reasons cannot be given for every-
thing we do and think; at some point our reasons for doing something 
give out. But this is not evidence of irrationality: “[…] the exhaustion 
of reasons – the inability of reasons to underpin the grounds – is not in 
any way irrational or epistemically defective” (Tully 1989, 181). In fact, 
the practice of giving reasons itself necessarily involves conventions that 
we are not required to give reasons for: “[…] our most sophisticated 
forms of reflection, including reflection on language games of reflections, 
are practices in the sense that participation in them presupposes custom-
ary ways of acting with or using words” (Tully 1989, 182). Our giving 
reasons presupposes the tacit agreements that arise from sharing a way of 
life and allow us to understand each other. What gives force to an argu-
ment is not its objective correctness, but the agreements we share with 
the person who presents it.
97154.indb   59 27/03/14   09:16
— 60 —
 Ethical Perspectives 21 (2014) 1
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – MARCH 2014
Reaching agreement, then, is not simply a matter of clearly commu-
nicating with one other; it does not involve building an indubitable tower 
of blocks, each balanced upon the one below. Agreement involves an 
intertwining net of conventions and values in which each element sup-
ports the other with none providing the base. These conventions and 
values can each be called into question, of course, but doing so would 
still require a set of background assumptions. We can transform this net, 
but we cannot disentangle ourselves from it entirely. The implication here 
is that expectation and desire for a rational political agreement is deeply 
problematic. Any substantive agreement will rest upon particular shared 
conventions that can always be contested. Denial of this is likely to result 
in the ongoing exclusion and marginalisation of those who do not share 
these conventions. 
Instead of an orientation towards inclusive and rational agreement, 
therefore, we support an orientation towards inclusive disagreement.
Such an orientation gestures away from environmental technocratic, eco-
authoritarian and green deliberative democratic accounts towards an 
 ‘agonistic’ approach. It is difficult to regard the disparate theorists of 
agonism as a ‘school’, but we could group Tully along with Mouffe (2000; 
2005; 2013) Connelly (1991) and Honig (1993) as united in their chal-
lenge of the notion of foundational political agreement (Edwards 2012, 
93). Mouffe’s agonism, in which conflict is constitutive of the political 
realm, holds invaluable insights for environmental politics (Machin 2012; 
2013). Mouffe incorporates bodies in her agonism to the extent that she 
highlights the role of passions, a bodily matter ignored by rationalist 
accounts (2005, 25). However, we concentrate here primarily on the 
agonistic orientation of Tully as he has gone further in contemplating the 
situatedness of human beings within ecological forms of life. Although 
Tully advocates what Mouffe would call an “agonism without antago-
nism” (2013, 9), his conception of agonism is also helpful in considering 
the pressing question of democratic institutional design that incorporates 
yet does not unnecessarily privilege technological expertise.3
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IV. EMBODIED BEGINNINGS
In this final section, following the work of Tully and ecological, feminist 
and phenomenological thinkers, we consider in more detail the inevita-
bility of disagreement in political debate over environmental issues. We 
suggest that environmental disagreement is importantly conditioned by the 
embodiment of political perspectives and that this should be acknowledged. 
Further, we propose that acknowledgement of embodiment might ‘green’ 
the political debate from the very outset.
As we began to show in the last section, Tully explains that individu-
als are not able to simply transcend their forms of life, to agree rationally 
and autonomously on universal norms of justice for example. Ecolo-
gists, he notes, are often acutely aware of the impossibility of agreeing 
on one conception of justice since they are aware that humans are not 
purely autonomous beings but rather that “[…] humans exist within, are 
dependent upon, and are members of the web of life, the innumerable 
ecosystems which make up the living world” (Tully 2001, 149).
Although he has not written extensively on environmental philoso-
phy, Tully’s work echoes strongly the ecological insight that human forms 
of life are a part of, not apart from, their material environments. As one 
scientific ecologist writes: “Life and the environment are one thing, not 
two, and people, as all life, are immersed in the one system. When we 
influence nature, we influence ourselves; when we change nature, we 
change ourselves” (Botkin 2012, 324; see also Grosz 1994; Plumwood 
1991; Shiva 1989; Soper 1995). To think ecologically is to notice that the 
forms of life in which humans act, think, speak, identify and feel have a 
material reality. What is often overlooked in much mainstream political 
theory is that our material environment is not distinct from or opposed 
to human consciousness, but is entangled with our forms of life and 
indelibly influences us, corporeally, affectively and often unconsciously.4
We are not crudely claiming here that people’s viewpoints are some-
how simplistically determined by their environment. It is not that the 
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individual is entirely indistinguishable from ‘nature’ as deep ecologists 
might have it, but that individuals and groups are importantly connected, in 
various ways, to their environments (Plumwood 1991). Living within a 
particular place and time indelibly impacts our preconscious existence, 
although in no fixed and predictable way. Those living in a flood-prone 
area, for example, have concerns that are immediate to them in ways that 
they are not to others, but people react differently to these existential 
dangers. The connection between perspective and situation works sym-
biotically: forms of life are always embedded within an environment, but 
the meanings and values that arise within a form of life sculpt the mate-
rial world around it: “While humans build the environments in which we 
live, work, worship and play, those environments, in turn, shape our 
understandings of ourselves” (Gabrielson and Parady 2010, 381). The 
construction of flood barriers, both material and ideological, for example, 
informs the particular viewpoints of people who construct them. There 
is an eternal entanglement, an interminable interrelationship between 
human perspective and material environment. “Subjectivity, including 
political subjectivity, is fleshly, is made out of flesh” (Beasley and Bacchi 
2000, 344).
Focusing upon the term ‘embodiment’ helps us grasp this interrela-
tionship between subjectivity and environment. We understand ‘embodi-
ment’ as the peculiar existence of human beings in the world. Bodies are 
at once part of material environment yet are also at the very centre of 
subjective perspectives. As phenomenological investigation has shown, 
bodies, socially constituted, have an intentionality and a pre-reflective or 
pre-personal agency of their own: “[…] the body is never merely a passive 
transmitter of messages but plays an active role in the generation of per-
ceptual meaning” (Coole 2005, 128). Bodies are not passive things, they 
actively influence consciousness with knowledge and affect: “Bodies are 
not inert; they function interactively and productively. They act and react. 
They generate what is new, surprising, unpredictable” (Grosz 1994, xi; 
see also Young 2005). The body situates actors within material and affective 
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reality and “[…] underlines the particular, passionate and perspectival 
nature of all claims” (Coole 2005, 129).5
The environment, then, does not only throw up political issues, it also 
conditions political perspectives. However, we cannot assume, as some greens 
might wish, that bodily position within their environment provides human 
beings with one common ‘green’ outlook. Shared bodily experience can 
indeed reveal and communicate collective identifications (Coole 2005, 134; 
Alcoff 1999). But environmental and corporeal differences can also augment 
conflicting perspectives with which participants in politics apprehend and 
affect the world. Attention to embodiment reaffirms the specificity of 
meaning and values that arise within a particular ecological form of life. 
Urban metropolises, rural villages, polar expanses and arid desert; these 
are diverse environments that are themselves variously experienced 
through differently positioned bodies.
Acknowledging our embodied existence, therefore, sharpens the 
challenge to any presupposition that as reasoning beings we simply step 
out of our different forms of life to an entirely abstract and transcenden-
tal position from which to survey our political options. This disturbs the 
apparent assumptions and hopes of many technocrats and deliberative 
democrats that individuals are able to evacuate their forms of life, putting 
their individual capacity for reason ahead of the conventions with which 
they live day to day. As Tully writes: “There is no view from nowhere” 
(1995, 56).
If agreement can never be full and final, should we give up on 
democratic discussion and simply focus on power and interests? Does 
this lead us back towards the anti-democratic stance of environmental 
technocracy? Tully does not advocate closing down political interaction; 
quite the opposite. He recognises that democratic discussion can free 
individuals from their narrow understandings: through “intersubjective 
dialogues” he suggests that participants “[…] come to acquire and appre-
ciate the cultural and biological diversity of our interdependent relation-
ship to all relevant aspects of the web of life” (2001, 159). Listening, in 
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Tully’s account of dialogue, is as important as speaking (see also Dob-
son 2012). Through attentive listening and responding we can come to 
better understand our own (and others’) ‘sedimented’ perspectives, to 
build connections with others, and to better understand the nature of 
difference and conflict. Tully explains that in any debate about environ-
mental issues, understanding what others are saying is not a matter of 
conforming to an allegedly universal rationality, but rather grasping 
their alternative practices. He takes the example of the interaction of 
Western and indigenous perspectives on environmental issues: “[…] the 
objective of these discussions is not to exchange Western and indige-
nous worldviews on the environment, but to understand the different 
practices in which Western environmental knowledge and the traditional 
ecological knowledge of indigenous peoples are embodied” (2001, 160). 
The aim here is not to reach agreement, but to expand awareness, open 
up alternatives and to ensure that decisions are not deemed full and 
final.
Grasping a different perspective does not just involve thinking harder 
or speaking more clearly; conscious rational reflection can only take us 
so far in grasping the perspectives of others and ourselves (Coole 1996). 
By attempting to comprehend another’s form of life and bodily reality by 
experiencing their way of life we can further broaden our own perspectives 
and question our own presuppositions and positions. By bodily entering 
a different material reality, perspectives are inevitably altered. Travelling 
to and from a heavily polluted city, we become conscious of the air we 
breathe. By being parched in a drought or battered in a hurricane, we gain 
a certain bodily awareness of new surroundings and our own physical 
frailty and dependency. Although these corporeal experiences are under-
stood within socially and culturally conditioned limits, they also allow the 
individual to reflect upon those limits, revealing alternative practices and 
meanings. They open up possibilities of transforming our own identifica-
tions and forming alliances with others. Bodies condition the individual’s 
viewpoint, but they also allow the individual to contest conventional 
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understandings. Yet we can never expect to replicate or fully grasp 
another’s particular experience; we cannot parachute into a different real-
ity. Shannon Sullivan notices the specificity of every single body and 
urges that we do not readily assume that we fully understand another: 
“I am not claiming that people can never understand one another through 
bodily gestures or that people’s intentions never duplicate one another 
[…]. But not always, and even when they do, my understanding of another 
is an accomplishment and a process, rather than a ready-made given pro-
vided by the body” (2002, 207). 
In revealing the limits of any particular perspective, the priority for 
Tully is to preserve what he calls the ‘dialogic civic freedom’ of citizens 
to be able to contest both democratic procedures and solutions (1994, 
99). It is this very participation in the struggle that helps create a ‘second 
order’ identity and loyalty to political institutions. Tully’s argument reso-
nates with claims that civic bonds arise not through any shared features 
or virtues of citizens nor any common substantive concept of ‘the good’, 
but rather through participation in the conversation that is valued in 
different ways (Kahane 1999). Mouffe offers a similar account of the 
importance of a shared loyalty to democratic values that nevertheless will 
be understood differently (2005, 31). Disagreement over the meaning 
of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ she explains “[…] provide the very stuff of 
democratic politics” (2005, 31). This insight shows how disagreement 
can actually foster and underpin political engagement and can protect 
democracy rather than threaten it.
In addition, instead of hindering environmental policies, embodied 
disagreement could potentially ‘green’ democracy from the outset. By 
bringing bodies to attention, the environment, understood in multiple 
and diverse ways, is brought to the fore in our individual and collective 
considerations (Machin 2013). A turn to embodiment can thus ‘green’ 
democracy in the sense that individuals and groups become more con-
scious of their own bodily positions and connections within their envi-
ronments, and the significance of their surroundings. Bennett suggests 
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that attentiveness to materiality could herald a more ecologically sound 
politics (2010). And Teena Gabrielson and Katelyn Parady explain in their 
discussion of corporeal citizenship that integrating environment into 
accounts of citizenship makes the concept inherently green (2010). We 
reiterate their point here with regards to democracy. By starting with 
embodiment, democratic engagement is ecologically grounded from the 
beginning, moving us away from the obsession with green ends that 
guides environmental technocracy. It does not hope for any guarantee of 
green outcomes but, as we have pointed out, nor is such guarantee pro-
vided by deliberative democracy or technocracy. We argue, in short, that 
recognition of the importance of bodies can both green democracy and 
reinvigorate it. 
V. CONCLUSION: EXPERT DISAGREEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
These reflections upon embodied disagreement lead us to re-consider the 
role of experts in environmental politics. Regarding scientists and econo-
mists not as disembodied minds but as living and breathing human beings 
disturbs many of the technocratic assumptions about objective facts 
and rational decision-making and the translation of science into politics. 
Scientists, economists and other experts think and communicate within 
forms of life, and their values and interests inform their work (Lahsen 
2005). Experts are embodied differently in their particular situations and 
in their overlapping and interconnecting roles as citizens, lovers, parents 
and so on. The crucial observation here is not that science should not be 
valued and heeded, but rather that science cannot decree policy. Science 
broadens many policy options between which there is no given or ‘cor-
rect’ choice (Pielke 2004). The relationship between the laboratory and 
the forum is not value free: both the construction of research projects 
and their interpretation in the political field are open to contestation 
(Demeritt 2001). The concept of ‘embodied disagreement’, we argue, 
complements these points by drawing attention to another, material, 
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dimension of difference. But it also extends the discussion by noting how 
an awareness of embodiment pulls the contested concept of environment 
into expert opinion from the beginning of the construction of knowledge 
claims.
Expert knowledge cannot produce an ideal solution and a full agree-
ment, as Tully warns: “[…] in any agreement we reach on procedures, 
principles, ethics, scientific studies or policies with respect to the environ-
ment, including any ecological paradigm, there will always be an element 
of reasonable doubt and dissension” (2001, 162). Technocratic tenden-
cies prioritising expert knowledge encroach upon the civic freedom that 
Tully argues underpins political participation. For Barry, too, prioritising 
technocratic or elite consensus endangers politics itself; it is crucial that 
decisions should never be regarded as final and should be the subject 
of contestation: “[…] the affirmation of contestation […] affirms the 
priority of politics and values over technocentric, elite, administrative, 
economic, or scientific decision-making processes” (Barry 2012, 269). 
Rather than assuming ‘once and for all solutions’, an orientation towards 
disagreement recognises that: “All agreements are revisable, settlements 
can be re-examined afresh, re-argued and re-negotiated in the light of new 
circumstances, empirical or scientific evidence, or new normative or polit-
ical claims” (Barry 2012, 269). Acknowledging the existence of political 
dissent does not hinder democracy, but reinvigorates it; noticing our 
embodied differences does not obstruct green ends, but rather heightens 
environmental awareness.
This orientation challenges the preoccupation with agreement, and 
points instead to the importance of creating political strategies and insti-
tutions that enable encounters between peoples with different worldviews 
(within and between cultures) such that they are better able to grasp their 
own and others’ ecological embodiment. This involves not only debating 
in different arenas, but direct experience of others’ material realities 
through which individuals and collectives can contest and transform their 
forms of life.
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How might this understanding of agonistic and embodied green 
democracy speak to questions of democratic institutional design and 
the role of expertise? There is much to be learnt from scholarship and 
practice influenced by deliberative democracy in the way that a division 
of labour between citizens and experts is arranged in mini-publics: not 
only in terms of the protected space that citizens are afforded, but also 
the explicit strategy of bringing together citizens with very diverse per-
spectives. But we should also note the importance of direct experience 
of others’ material embodiment. Here, the example of a citizen’s jury 
in Australia engaged in deliberations over access to an area of rain-forest 
is pertinent: the participants were taken on a field-trip to experience first 
hand the lived reality of locals and the broader ecological and social 
context, both of which affected their collective judgements (Niemeyer 
2004). A second illuminating example from another field of activity is 
the practice of ‘caravans of priorities’ in participatory budgeting in Latin 
American cities. Here community delegates charged with prioritising 
demands from different neighbourhoods visit other localities to better 
understand the lived realities of that community. Delegates’ perspec-
tives are significantly altered through this first hand experience, chang-
ing the outcome of decisions (Smith 2009, 58).6 The focus in demo-
cratic institutional design on voice and rhetoric over direct experience 
suggests one reason why environmental issues have been poorly served 
and hints at how new institutional forms that support a green demo-
cratic agonism and the necessary dialogic civic freedom might be 
designed.
To conclude, this paper suggests an alternative way of bringing 
environmental considerations into political decision-making. Rejecting 
democratic process in favour of technocracy will not ensure green out-
comes. Neither is a focus on rational deliberative means a way of ensur-
ing ecologically-sensitive democracy. Our suggestion is rather that a green 
democratic project requires recognition of the constitutive nature of both 
differential ecological embodiment and political disagreement.7 
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NOTES
1. http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org. 
2. The example of mini-publics is only illustrative. There are plenty of other institutional 
designs that interest deliberative democrats beyond these decision-recommending forums, both 
traditional and innovative (Fung 2003; Steiner et al. 2004; Warren 2010) 
3. The move towards agonism is supported in Barry’s recent book, The Politics of Actually 
Existing Unsustainability, in which, in contrast to his earlier alignment with deliberative democ-
racy, he now briefly asserts an ‘agonistic republicanism’ (Barry 2012, 270-272). Note that Barry 
does not draw on Tully’s work, but rather that of Mouffe (Barry 2012, 267-272). This is a rather 
strange theoretical choice given that the details of the political strategy and republican arrange-
ments that he clearly prefers are closer to that of Tully than the more adversarial political strategies 
associated with Mouffe. A comparison of the implications of different accounts of agonism for 
green political theory will have to wait for another occasion. 
4. This corresponds to the opposition between ‘human’ and ‘culture’ to ‘nature’. Yet as Kate 
Soper importantly observes, ‘nature’ is confusingly regarded both as separate from ourselves yet 
also something we are within (Soper 1995, 21). 
5. Jane Bennett goes even further to suggest that non-human objects themselves have a 
certain material agency (2010). 
6. Additionally, celebrated examples of participatory budgeting realise a degree of reflexivity 
and revisability in relation to the rules of engagement (Smith 2009, 49) that will be attractive to 
those who hold that democratic procedures themselves must be open to negotiation. 
7. We would like to thank Stijn Neuteleers for organizing the CREIDD workshop and also 
the two anonymous reviewers for their comments.
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